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Filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) are recommended for use as precautions against air-
borne pathogenic microorganisms; however, during pandemics demand for FFRs may far ex-
ceed availability. Reuse of FFRs following decontamination has been proposed but few
reported studies have addressed the feasibility. Concerns regarding biocidal efficacy, respira-
tor performance post decontamination, decontamination cost, and user safety have impeded
adoption of reuse measures. This study examined the effectiveness of three energetic decon-
tamination methods [ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI), microwave-generated steam,
and moist heat] on two National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health-certified N95
FFRs (3M models 1860s and 1870) contaminated with H5N1. An aerosol settling chamber
was used to apply virus-laden droplets to FFRs in a method designed to simulate respiratory
deposition of droplets onto surfaces. When FFRs were examined post decontamination by vi-
ral culture, all three decontamination methods were effective, reducing virus load by >4 log
median tissue culture infective dose. Analysis of treated FFRs using a quantitative molecular
amplification assay (quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction) indicated that UVGI
decontamination resulted in lower levels of detectable viral RNA than the other two methods.
Filter performance was evaluated before and after decontamination using a 1% NaCl aerosol.
As all FFRs displayed <5% penetration by 300-nm particles, no profound reduction in filtration
performance was caused in the FFRs tested by exposure to virus and subsequent decontamina-
tion by the methods used. These findings indicate that, when properly implemented, these meth-
ods effectively decontaminate H5N1 on the two FFR models tested and do not drastically affect
their filtering function; however, other considerations may influence decisions to reuse FFRs.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent emergence of novel strains of influenza
virus has renewed public health interest in the trans-
mission and control of infectious agents. Significant
attention has been placed on the avian influenza
virus H5N1 and 2009 H1N1 (California) influenza
virus type A. The communicable nature of these
pathogens has created demand for inexpensive and
efficient respiratory protection. Disposable filtering
facepiece respirators (FFRs) are commonly used to
reduce the exposure to airborne particles. FFRs have
been recommended for use as part of a comprehen-
sive infection control strategy by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC). Manufacturers
of respirators [those that are both approved by the
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National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) as respirators and approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for medical
uses] recommend that they be discarded if soiled
or contaminated. However, the epidemic potential
of influenza raises concerns that the manufacturing
supply of FFRs would be unable to meet a sudden
surge in demand. The Institute of Medicine (IOM)
estimated that the healthcare sector would require
90 million FFRs for a 6-week influenza pandemic
outbreak (Bailar et al., 2006). This estimate, com-
bined with the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration’s (OSHA) prediction that an influenza
pandemic would last 24 weeks (OSHA, 2009), sug-
gests that an outbreak could require as many as
360 million FFRs. The likelihood of widespread
FFR shortages has prompted the consideration of re-
use of FFRs during pandemics, when supply is short
and the device has not been visibly soiled or dam-
aged (Bailar et al., 2006; Siegel et al., 2007; APIC,
2009; OSHA, 2009; CDC, 2010). Although reuse
may increase the potential for cross-contamination,
FFR shortages may impose a far greater burden on
the ability to control an outbreak. Therefore, a need
exists for objective experimental information upon
which decisions about the safety and practicality of
decontamination for reuse of FFRs can be based.
FFRs remove pathogenic microorganisms from
aerosols generated by infected individuals and are thus
potentially fomites. Viability of influenzavirus on inan-
imate surfaces is well-recognized even though it may
be highly variable (Bean et al., 1982; Brady et al.,
1990; Tiwari et al., 2006; Boone and Gerba, 2007;
Weber and Stilianakis, 2008). Since previously worn
FFRs may serve as a reservoir for the spread of virus,
the reuse of filters exposed to microorganisms requires
careful consideration. If respirator shortages are to be
mitigated through reuse, rapid, low-cost, and efficient
decontamination methods must be established.
This study evaluated the virucidal capability of three
energetic decontamination methods: ultraviolet germi-
cidal irradiation (UVGI), microwave-generated steam
(MGS), and moist heat (MH). These methods were
utilized to two models of commercially available
NIOSH-approved N95 FFRs, on which standardized
quantities of influenza (A/H5N1) virus were applied
as aerosolized droplets.
METHODS
Experimental design
FFR models 1860s and 1870 (3M Company, St Paul,
MN, USA) were selected for study and exposed to in-
fluenza virus-containing aerosol using an aerosol test
system. Influenza virus type A of the low-pathogenicity
H5N1 strain was selected for use. Table 1 shows the
study design, whereby a total of 108 FFRs were ex-
posed and studied. ‘Exposure’ refers to the application
of virus and ‘treatment’ refers to application of any one
of the three decontamination procedures. The treated
respirators were subjected to one of three decontamina-
tion methods while the non-treated respirators served
as controls and were exposed to virus but received
no disinfection treatment. All untreated FFRs were
incubated for the same duration of time and at the
same environmental conditions (temperature and hu-
midity) as the treated respirators.
Treatment and extraction times were held constant
between FFRs exposed to virus and the controls. Virus
was applied using the droplet method described below.
Respirator descriptions. Two models of N95
FFRs common in healthcare settings were chosen
for this study: 3M models 1860s (small size)—a
ridged, cup-shaped design—and 1870, a flat-fold/
three-panel design. Both designs are multi-layered
and use a filtration medium of electrostatically
charged, polypropylene microfibers. These FFRs
are commercially available and carry a NIOSH
N95 filter efficiency rating (NIOSH Federal Respira-
tory Regulations 42 CFR Part 84). The N95 designa-
tion certifies that respirators are 95% efficient at
capturing oil-free airborne particles and aerosols
with an aerodynamic mass median diameter of 300
nm when evaluated at the NIOSH-specified test con-
ditions. These respirators have also been approved
by FDA as medical devices.
Virus stock. Influenza A/H5N1 (VNH5N1) was
acquired from the CDC and transferred with authori-
zation to a commercial laboratory for production in
eggs. Virus was produced and recovered from allan-
toic fluid and quantified. After receipt, the virus
stock was re-titered in house. The viral titer was
5.5 log10 median tissue culture infective dose assay
(TCID-50) ml-150 ml
1.
Droplet chamber. The aerosol test system (Fig. 1)
used in this study was designed to mimic respiratory
droplet transmission of viruses onto surfaces
(ASTM: E2721-10, ASTM, 2010). The chamber
was composed of a stainless steel box measuring
Table 1. FFR sample sets exposed to H5N1 virus.
FFR models Control UVGI Control MGS Control MH # Tests
3M 1860s 9 9 9 9 9 9 54
3M 1870 9 9 9 9 9 9 54
Total 108
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61  61  76 cm with an approximate volume of 283
l. A pneumatic atomizing nozzle mounted vertically in
the top of the chamber generated large, virus-laden
droplets as described below. Airflow inside the cham-
ber was designed to allow direct settling onto the FFRs.
FFRs were rotated slowly on a turntable inside the
chamber to achieve uniform deposition. Air containing
excess aerosol flowed out of the chamber through
a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter at the bot-
tom. Relative humidity (RH) and temperature within
the test chamber were measured and maintained at con-
stant levels throughout the testing. The aerosol test
chamber was operated within a BSL3 laboratory facil-
ity and housed inside a Purair 20 ductless fume hood
(Air Science LLC, Fort Myers, FL, USA).
Droplet size characterization. Droplet size distri-
bution of the nozzle was characterized using a Spray-
tec droplet analyzer (Malvern, Worcestershire, UK)
using standard conditions specified by the manufac-
turer. The Spraytec could not be directly linked with
the chamber so the nozzle was analyzed external to
the chamber, which may have produced smaller
droplets due to an overall reduction in RH. The noz-
zle was operated at the same conditions used in this
study (see below) and droplets were analyzed at five
locations downstream of the nozzle (5, 15, 30, 45,
and 60 cm).
Viral droplet loading protocol. Respirators were
arranged in two equally spaced, concentric circles
on the rotating platform inside the aerosol chamber.
The door was sealed and rotation of the platform was
adjusted to three revolutions per minute. As the table
revolved, the pneumatic atomizing nozzle (model
2000VL; Paasche, Chicago, IL, USA) delivered 25
ml of influenza A/H5N1 virus suspension at a con-
centration of 5.5 log10 TCID50 ml
1.
A flowmeter (Cole–Parmer, Vernon Hills, IL, USA)
regulated delivery of 4 l min1 of HEPA-filtered
air to the nebulizer, which atomized5 ml of viral sus-
pension per minute until the reservoir was depleted. The
average time of exposure ranged between 5 and 8 min.
After exposure, the airflow was shut off and aerosol
remaining within the chamber was allowed to settle
for 3 min before the respirators were removed. Treated
filters were exposed to one of the three decontamination
methods while the non-treated filters were used as
controls. All aerosol tests were conducted using an un-
diluted virus concentration of 5.5 log10 TCID50 ml
1.
Under test conditions, the RH within the chamber
was.60% and the temperature range was 22 – 2C.
Virus extraction efficiency. To determine the ex-
traction efficiency from the test material, a single cir-
cular coupon was cut from each of the four quadrants
of the FFRs using a 3.8-cm diameter (11.3 cm2) arch
Fig. 1. Schematic of the aerosol test system.
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punch (C.S. Osborne & Co., Harrison, NJ, USA).
A volume of 250 ll of virus stock (1 ml total per
set) was pipetted onto each coupon and allowed to
dry for 20 min inside the biosafety cabinet. The cou-
pons (four total) were placed in a 50-ml conical tube
containing 15 ml of serum-free Eagle’s minimum es-
sential medium (sf-EMEM) supplemented with 1%
penicillin–streptomycin and 10% L-glutamine. Con-
ical tubes were mixed for 20 min to liberate virus
particles from the coupons using a multi-tube vortex
mixer (VWR Scientific, West Chester, PA, USA) at
maximum speed. The supernatants were then re-
moved from the tubes and aliquots assayed for viable
virus particles through log serial dilutions in sf-
EMEM. Results were expressed as virus titers in
units of log10 TCID50 ml
1. Quantitative real-time
polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR) was per-
formed on the recovered supernatant and mean cycle
threshold (Ct) values were compared to the stock
concentration. Each experiment was performed in
triplicate.
Virus culture quantification. Virus was quantified
using Diagnostic HYBRIDS FreshCells cell cul-
tures (Athens, OH, USA). The Madin–Darby canine
kidney cells were maintained using standard meth-
ods, plates were incubated, and wells were moni-
tored daily for presence or absence of cytopathic
effect (CPE) by observation with an inverted light
microscope. On day five, adherent cells were fixed
with 400 ll of a 0.07% (w/v) crystal violet and
10% (v/v) glutaraldehyde solution for 1 h. Plate-well
monolayers were scored for CPE and virus titers
quantified according to the Spearman–Karber formula
(Finney, 1978). The cell culture limit of detection was
empirically set at.0.5 log10 TCID50. Therefore, any
data resulting in values below the detection limit
(BDL) were expressed as zero in log reduction cal-
culations (Tables 2 and 3).
Decontamination procedures. Virus-laden respi-
rators were subjected to one of three decontamina-
tion procedures as described below. The orientation
of the filter was convex panel facing the droplet or
treatment source. Controls were subjected to the
same decontamination procedures as the treated
FFRs but were not exposed to virus.
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation. A 126- (L) 
15.2- (W)  10.8-cm (H), dual-bulb, 15-W UV-C
(254-nm wavelength) lamp (Ultraviolet Products,
Upland, CA, USA) was placed in a Labgard class
II, type A2, laminar flow cabinet (NuAire, Inc., Ply-
mouth, MN, USA) set to a height 25 cm above the
cabinet’s working surface. Measured by a UVX dig-
ital radiometer (UVP Inc., Upland, CA, USA), the
lamp’s UV-C wavelength irradiance ranged between
1.6 mW cm2 and 2.2 mW cm2. Virus-laden respi-
rators were placed inside the cabinet, directly under
the ultraviolet lamp with the convex panel facing the
treatment, and exposed for a total of 15 min at a UV-
C wavelength dose of 18 kJ m2.
Microwave-generated steam. A 1250-W (2450
MHz) commercially available microwave oven
(Panasonic Corp., Secaucus, NJ, USA) with a rotat-
ing glass plate was used to irradiate a single respira-
tor per treatment. Samples were placed above
Table 2. Mean log10 TCID50 virus concentrations recovered from 3M 1860s FFRs.
3M 1860s UVGI MGS MH
Non-treated Treated Non-treated Treated Non-treated Treated
Replicate 1 4.51 BDLa 4.76 BDLa 4.68 BDLa
Replicate 2 4.68 BDLa 4.84 BDLa 4.68 BDLa
Replicate 3 4.43 BDLa 4.84 BDLa 4.51 BDLa
DLog10 TCID50 .4.54 .4.81 .4.62
Non-treated, No decontamination procedure was performed (control group).
aBDL , 0.5 log10 TCID50.
Table 3. Mean log10 TCID50 virus concentrations recovered from 3M 1870 FFRs.
3M 1870 UVGI MGS MH
Non-treated Treated Non-treated Treated Non-treated Treated
Replicate 1 4.93 BDLa 4.76 BDLa 4.68 BDLa
Replicate 2 4.68 BDLa 4.76 BDLa 4.68 BDLa
Replicate 3 4.34 BDLa 4.84 BDLa 4.59 BDLa
DLog10 TCID50 .4.65 .4.79 .4.65
aBDL , 0.5 log10 TCID50.
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a plastic box filled with 50 ml of room temperature
tap water. The top of the box was perforated with
96 holes (7 mm diameter) evenly distributed over
the entire surface to allow MGS to vent through
the respirator. The virus-contaminated respirator
was placed with the convex surface pointed toward
the steam source and the FFR was then irradiated
for 2 min at full power.
Moist heat. A 6-l sealable container (19 19 17
cm) was filled with 1 l of tap water, placed in an oven
(Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., Marietta, OH, USA),
and heated to 65 – 5C for 3 h. This allowed the liquid
to reach the desired temperature prior to any decontam-
ination tests. For testing, the container was removed
from the oven and a single virus-contaminated respira-
tor was placed on the rack. For each decontamination
procedure, the container was opened and the FFR
placed onto the rack with the convex surface pointed to-
ward the water layer. The container was then sealed and
returned to the oven for the 20-min treatment.
Physical penetration measurements. To determine
whether the decontamination methods had any effect on
the filter performance, each of the three decontamina-
tion methods described above was applied to five sepa-
rate samples of each model of FFR listed in Table 1.
Physical penetration measurements were then con-
ducted with a 1% NaCl aerosol challenge as described
in Lore et al. (2010). Filter testing was performed at
a flow rate of 85 l min1, the flow rate specified by
NIOSH for FFR certification testing.
Data analysis
Determination of viable virus concentrations.
Viable virus particles were quantified by median
TCID50 using the Spearman–Karber formula (Finney,
1978). This widely used methodology utilizes dilu-
tions of pathogenic agents to demonstrate absolute
thresholds of infectivity (0 or 100%). Infectivity is
defined as the concentration capable of producing
an observable CPE in the cell culture monolayer.
Sample inocula were performed over a range of geo-
metric series dilutions that bracketed the infectivity
threshold. This allowed for positive identification of
infectivity and proper application of the Spearman–
Karber formula. The Dlog10 TCID50 between the
control samples and the treated samples was calcu-
lated as Dlog10 TCID50 5 log10 TCID50 (control) 
log10 TCID50 (test). Results were expressed as virus
titers in units of log10 TCID50 ml
1.
Virus quantification by qRT-PCR. Viral RNA
(vRNA) was extracted using a QIAamp vRNA ex-
traction kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) according
to the manufacturer’s instructions. The vRNA was
recovered in 15 ll (final volume) of elution buffer
and quantitated spectrophotometrically (in triplicate)
using NanoDrop ND-1000 (Saveen Werner, Lim-
hamn, Sweden). vRNA amplification of the hemag-
glutinin viral protein target (H5a) was carried out
according to the CDC protocol using Invitrogen’s
SuperScript III Platinum One-Step qRT-PCR System
(cat no. 11732-088), which combines the reverse
transcription and amplification steps.
Assay conditions for quantification of extracted
vRNA were optimized in a Roche LightCycler 480
Real-Time PCR System (Roche Diagnostics). The
Superscript III Platinum mastermix reaction compo-
nents were prepared to the indicated end concentra-
tion: 5.5 ll nuclease-free water, 0.5 ll H5a-F
forward primer (SO3307; CDC), 0.5 ll H5a-R reverse
primer (SO3308; CDC), 0.5 ll H5a-P probe
(SO3294; CDC), SuperScript III RT/Platinum Taq
mix (Invitrogen), and 12.5 ll 2 PCR master mix.
For each sample, 20 ll of the complete LightCycler
mastermix and 5 ll of extracted vRNA (25 ll total)
were loaded into each well of a 96-well plate. The
plate was then loaded into the LightCycler. Samples
were run in triplicate for each dilution and presented
as the Ct value.
The qRT-PCR thermocycling parameters were as
follows: initial complementary DNA synthesis at
50C for 30 min and then denaturation at 95C for
2 min, followed by 45 cycles of 15 s of denaturing
at 95C, 30 s of annealing at 55C, and 30 s of exten-
sion at 72C with a final holding step at 4C. Total run
time was2 h. The cut-off for determining a negative
sample was 37 Ct units.
A standard curve was generated from a dilution se-
ries constructed from an extracted stock virus sample.
RT-PCR was performed on serial log dilutions of the
stock in triplicate using the Roche LightCycler 480.
These data provided the reference standard by which
experimental samples could be extrapolated. Effi-
ciency of the RT-PCR reaction was estimated through
linear regression analysis of the dilution curve. This
was performed using the LINEST function of Micro-
soft Excel v2007 (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond,
WA, USA), which draws the best-fit line using the
least-squares method of regression analysis.
The limit of quantification (LoQ) was determined
for the qRT-PCR reaction by serial log dilution of ex-
tracted vRNA to the lowest dilutions reliably detect-
able (7 and 8). Twenty replicate series of both
dilutions were prepared and run simultaneously in
triplicate. A confidence interval (CI) was then calcu-
lated by multiplying the non-amplified samples by 5
and subtracting from 100. This number was then re-
ported as a percentage. Only threshold cycle values
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,40 were included in the data set. A CI of 95%
was utilized. Sample dilutions with Ct values above
36.5 were considered negative.
RESULTS
The consideration for reuse of FFRs following de-
contamination must address two major issues: first,
whether the FFR retains full function and provides
a similar level of protection after treatment and sec-
ond whether the decontamination treatment is effec-
tive at reducing the infectious capability of the
targeted organism. This study focused primarily on
the second point and the development of methods
for accurate assessment of the amount of virus con-
taminating the FFR and the amount removed by the
decontamination method. To achieve this goal, the
first challenge was to demonstrate uniform applica-
tion of virus-laden droplets and recovery of virus
from FFRs.
Droplet size variation
Droplets at the source were 5 lm count median
diameter (CDM) and they grew to 12 lm CMD
at the 30-cm mark, presumably due to coalescence
of the droplets. The droplet size at the 60-cm mark
was back down to 5 lm again, which is most likely
due to evaporation.
Virus recovery and extraction efficiency
FFRs are intended to protect the user by capturing
infectious particles within the composite materials of
the device, either the surface covering or the filtering
medium. Due to uncertainty about the depth to which
virus would penetrate the cover web, all layers were
sampled. Following application of virus to the FFRs,
a total of four, circular, full-thickness cuttings (cou-
pons) were taken comprising a total area of 45.36
cm2. Because this study focused on vertical settling
of large droplets, only the panel facing the droplet
source was sampled. The total estimated area of
the convex surface of 1860s and 1870 was 129.46
and 202.79 cm2, respectively. The efficiency of
recovery of vRNA from all coupon replicate sets
was 70 – 5% (data not shown) as determined by
qRT-PCR.
qRT-PCR limit of detection, LoQ, and calibration
The limit of detection of the PCR method was de-
termined as summarized in the methods section using
serial dilutions of vRNA. Using a CI limit of 95%, the
Roche LightCycler 480 reliably detected a 7-log se-
rial dilution of the H5N1 virus stock. The slope of
the standard curve used for calibration purposes was
3.48 with an R2 value of 0.998.
Decontamination assessed by viral culture
The effect of the three decontamination treatments
was assessed on two different models of FFRs (Table 1).
Viral recovery from FFRs with and without treatment
was assessed by the tissue culture method. Results com-
paring the recovery of virus expressed as log10 TCID50
ml1 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 for 1860s and 1870
respirators, respectively. Each value reported within
the table was the mean of three FFRs tested under iden-
tical conditions. In total, 27 treated and 27 untreated
FFRs were tested for each model of FFR. The decrease
in virus titer was calculated by subtracting the average
of the treated group from the untreated (control) group.
Results were reported as the mean log reduction invirus
titer. In all cases, decontamination procedures resulted
in viable counts below the cell culture assay’s detection
limit (BDL).
The mean concentration of influenza A/H5N1
virus recovered from all untreated (control) 1860s
samples was 4.66 log10 TCID50. Within each treat-
ment, the virus titer replicates were within –0.25
SD log10 TCID50 of each other and between groups
–0.27 SD log10 TCID50 (Table 2).
The mean concentration of influenza A/H5N1
virus recovered from all untreated (control) 1870
samples was 4.70 log10 TCID50. Within each treat-
ment group, the virus titer replicates were within
–0.59 log10 TCID50 of each other and between
groups –0.14 log10 TCID50 (Table 3).
The average log recovery of virus obtained for all
untreated controls with the 1860s was 4.66 log10
TCID50, similar to the 3M 1870, from which recov-
ery was 4.70 log10 TCID50. The log10 TCID50 reduc-
tion for the decontaminated 1860s respirators was
4.54 (UVGI), 4.81(MGS), and 4.62 (MH).
The log10 TCID50 reduction for the 1870 respirators
exposed to decontamination methods was 4.65
(UVGI), 4.79 (MGS), and 4.65 (MH). All three
decontamination methods achieved an absolute log
reduction of .4.0 logs for both respirator models.
Decontamination assessed by qRT-PCR
vRNA extraction was performed on an aliquot of
the same eluate used to recover viable virus, and
qRT-PCR was performed as described. All values
are reported as Ct units representing the number of
amplification cycles. Testing of the coupons from
non-treated FFRs (control) showed an average Ct
value of 16.72 – 0.7, demonstrating the reproducibility
of the application and recovery process over multiple
days. Within-run coefficient of variation was ,7%.
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Each value within the table represented a mean of nine
replicates. Analysis of the treated samples showed
a difference in Ct cycles between the UVGI decontam-
ination method and the other two methods, MGS and
MH, for both FFR models. Material recovered from
UVGI-treated samples required more amplification
cycles to detect vRNA than from either of the other
methods. Consistent with the TCID50 determinations,
there was no significant difference between MGS
and MH as determined by qRT-PCR (Table 4). These
results demonstrated that although no viable virus was
detectable following decontamination as measured
by culture, none of the methods disrupted the
viral genome to a level that could not be amplified
by PCR.
Post-decontamination filter performance
Results indicate that the mean penetration at 300 nm
was ,5% for all FFR models tested (Table 5). These
data demonstrate that the decontamination methods
did not significantly degrade the filter performance at
300-nm particle size.
DISCUSSION
During pandemics, shortages of FFRs may lead to
their reuse to extend supplies. This is currently a poten-
tial strategy being considered by several government
agencies (e.g. CDC) during times of shortage—pro-
vided the respirator is not visibly soiled or damaged
and does not impede breathing. However, bioaerosol
contamination, which often does not display gross
soiling, may pose a risk to the user if viable pathogenic
microorganisms are still present. Furthermore, without
proper guidance and procedures, any non-standardized
decontamination method may prove to be inadequate.
The functionality of the device must also be consid-
ered, as decontamination methods may damage straps,
nosefoam, and other components that affect the fit.
The objective of this study was to evaluate the viru-
cidal effects of three energetic decontamination meth-
ods—UVGI, MGS, and MH—on FFRs exposed to
large droplets delivered as aerosols containing influ-
enza A/H5N1 virus. The viral load deposition in this
study represented a ‘worst-case scenario’, in which
the viral load onto the FFRs was in probable excess
of what a user in a healthcare setting would realisti-
cally expect to encounter. These methods were se-
lected based on several factors including common
availability, low cost of the technology, and ease of
use. For example, high-energy irradiation is present
in many hospitals but would not be available to the
general public. Efficacy guidelines have yet to be es-
tablished for FFR fomite decontamination and patho-
genic viruses. However, recommendations have been
issued by the IOM regarding reusability of face masks
during an influenza pandemic. The IOM suggests that
any decontamination method applied to an N95 FFR
must eliminate the viral threat, be harmless to the
user, and have no deleterious effects on filter perfor-
mance (Bailar et al., 2006). This recommendation is
in agreement with previously published guidance on
the virucidal test effectiveness on inanimate surfaces
set forth by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) (EPA, 1982). Therefore, this study used the
EPA criterion of complete inactivation of the virus
at all dilutions, quantified using the Spearman–Karber
method expressed as log10 TCID50, to demonstrate
successful decontamination.
In addition to TCID50 assays, a molecular-based
analysis of the samples was performed using qRT-
PCR. This non-culture technique, which detects vRNA
with sensitivity several orders of magnitude greater
than culture assays, can provide additional insight into
the extent of biocidal effects beyond infectivity assays.
However, molecular amplification assays for the as-
sessment of decontamination effectiveness have not
been addressed by regulatory agencies.
UVGI is a highly energetic short-wave (254 nm)
ultraviolet light shown to be a useful sterilization tech-
nique in a variety of applications. The virucidal mech-
anism of UVGI is derived from the energy contained
within the electromagnetic wave. Single-stranded
RNAviruses have been shown to be especially suscep-
tible to this type of radiation (Rauth, 1965; Tseng
and Li, 2005). Miller and Plagemann (1974) demon-
strated these effects on mengovirus, an RNAvirus anal-
ogous to influenza virus. Their results demonstrated
Table 5. Mean penetration (n 5 5) of 1% NaCl aerosol at
300-nm particle size.
FFR Control UVGI MGS MH
1860s (%) 1.08 0.99 1.51 1.04
1870 (%) 0.39 0.37 0.99 0.99
Table 4. qRT-PCR Ct and coefficient of variation (CV)
values of FFRs exposed to H5N1 aerosol.
UVGI MGS MH
Ct CV (%) Ct CV (%) Ct CV (%)
3M 1860s
Control 16.39 4.42 16.14 6.63 16.88 2.71
Treated 30.67 2.97 21.8 5.87 22.98 5.62
3M 1870
Control 16.59 1.67 16.98 5.66 17.36 3.95
Treated 29.1 5.60 19.81 4.01 20.05 2.45
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progressively increasing changes in the viral proteins,
which are the determinants of infectivity.
In this study, a 15-min exposure to high-intensity
UVGI was found to be an effective virucidal treatment.
A reduction of .4 log10 TCID50 ml
1 was ob-
served for both FFRs, indicating functionally com-
plete removal of detectable virus by culture assay.
In comparison, results of the qRT-PCR assay indi-
cated a significant reduction in amplified RNA
(14 cycles, Table 4) following decontamination
procedures; however, amplifiable vRNA remained.
These results suggest that the energy input of the UV-
GI decontamination method was capable of eliminat-
ing viral infectivity as seen by the cell culture (TCID)
assay. Our data indicate that the virus’ infectivity is
destroyed but its RNA genetic signature remains, as
shown by the reduction in viral genome amplified.
These data are in good agreement with previous
observations of the effectiveness of UVGI on FFRs
as measured by plaque assay made by Vo et al.
(2009) and Fisher and Shaffer (2011) using surrogate
viruses.
Microwave radiation is a form of radio frequency en-
ergy that, as when used in household ovens (2450
MHz), excites water molecules, generating heat. Mi-
crowave heating has been shown to inactivate or reduce
several species of pathogenic microorganisms (Woo
et al., 2000). Despite many well-documented studies
on microbial damage by microwave irradiation, the
mechanism of action is not entirely understood. How-
ever, the presence of moisture appears to be a key factor
influencing the biocidal effect (Vela and Wu, 1979;
Jeng et al., 1987). Therefore, the combined mecha-
nisms of radiation and steam heat were applied in this
study (MGS) where the FFRs were supported above
a water reservoir during the decontamination process.
This allowed steam generated from the water to pass
through the FFR, further enhancing the biocidal effects
of the microwave radiation treatment.
The MGS decontamination procedure relied solely
on steam for disinfection. The biocidal action of
steam is believed to be derived from the liquid phase’s
latent heat of vaporization, which is released upon
contact, allowing the exotherm to denature enzymes
and other essential cell constituents of the organism.
The MH decontamination method is mechanisti-
cally analogous to the MGS decontamination, in
which warm moisture acts as the main component
of biocidal action. This method was chosen over
dry heat sterilization because MH is more effective
than dry heat for killing microorganisms and lower
heat input is less likely to have deleterious results
on filter performance (Hutten, 2007; Viscusi
et al., 2007, 2009).
As tested, each method (MGS and MH) was fully
effective in inactivating influenza A/H5N1 virus par-
ticles for both FFR models. The EPA criterion for vi-
rucidal test effectiveness was met in this study, using
the virus culture method, by the demonstration of
results below detectable limits. Although the virus
was completely inactivated by the MGS and MH
treatments as assessed by culture methods, qRT-
PCR methods were able to detect viral genomic ma-
terial. More of the viral genomic material remained
amplifiable following MGS and MH than after the
UVGI treatment (Table 4). This was expected given
that the mode of action of both methods is denatur-
ation of proteins. Some vRNA was also denatured,
which accounted for the reduction in amplified
RNA. The results from treatment by MGS or MH
were comparable even though the time of treatment
differed from 2 to 20 min, respectively.
One challenge related to decontamination using
a microwave-based method is the concern that the
metal noseband of FFRs would generate combus-
tion. Previous studies have demonstrated that dry
microwave irradiation caused the filtration medium
around metallic nosebands to melt (Viscusi et al.,
2007, 2009). In this study, the microwave-based de-
contamination method used steam as the dominant
biocidal mechanism. Much of the energy is ab-
sorbed by water—reducing the potential for damage
to the filtration medium. Gross observation of the
FFRs post-MGS treatment showed no signs of filter
damage. Furthermore, results of the penetration
tests indicated that the decontamination methods
did not significantly alter the filter performance at
the 300-nm particle diameter (Table 5). It is impor-
tant to note that, although the physical penetration
was measured under conditions similar to those of
the NIOSH certification test, these results are not
equivalent to official NIOSH certification testing.
The filtration measurements reported herein should
not be interpreted as having any bearing on whether
a particular FFR sample meets its designated
NIOSH certification.
Any factor that contributes to nonuniform distribu-
tion of steam across the face of the respirator can alter
its effectiveness. For MGS, the reservoir’s surface
area, liquid volume, and microwave power level are
significant in relation to the exposure time. Smaller
liquid surface areas, larger liquid volumes, or a micro-
wave delivering ,1250 W will require longer expo-
sure times to generate sufficient amounts of steam.
This decontamination method was the least time in-
tensive and utilized commonly available items found
in most households. The low throughput might restrict
its use in large healthcare settings but this technology
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would be practicable for home use or small organiza-
tions. This study was limited to evaluating the effect
of three decontamination methods on the mask
surface and did not examine the straps or nose clip.
Additional evaluation must be considered regarding
other components of the FFR prior to general adoption
of these decontamination methods. Further research
is appropriate to standardize this process and confirm
its effectiveness for use by healthcare workers, first
responders, and the general public.
CONCLUSION
This study showed that three decontamination
methods (ultraviolet germicidal irradiation, MGS,
and MH) satisfactorily decontaminated the 3M
1860s and 1870 FFRs as measured by a virus culture
method. Within the constraints of the experiment, the
three methods were all completely effective for the
decontamination of FFRs as assessed by a culture
method. These conclusions are further supported by
data reported by Heimbuch et al. (2011) in which
H1N1 droplets and droplet nuclei applied to six mod-
els of FFRs were decontaminated using the same
three energetic methods described here. The construc-
tion or type of FFR did not result in any measured dif-
ference among the decontamination methods applied.
These findings suggest that, when properly imple-
mented, these decontamination methods could sup-
press cross-contamination through contact with FFRs
during situations in which reusing FFRs is necessary.
However, these conclusions apply only to the models
tested in this study—other FFR models may show dif-
ferent effects. Although this study did not investigate
the effect of these treatments on fit, Viscusi et al.
(2011) reported no significant decrease in the protec-
tive capability of FFRs following decontamination.
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